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Abstract—Cellular has always relied on static deployments
for providing wireless access. However, even the emerging fifth-
generation (5G) networks may face difficulty in supporting
the increased traffic demand with rigid, fixed infrastructure
without substantial over-provisioning. This is particularly true
for spontaneous large-scale events that require service providers
to augment capacity of their networks quickly. Today, the use of
aerial devices equipped with high-rate radio access capabilities
has the potential to offer the much needed ”on-demand” capacity
boost. Conversely, it also threatens to rattle the long-standing
business strategies of wireless operators, especially as the ”gold
rush” for cheaper millimeter wave (mmWave) spectrum lowers
the market entry barriers. However, the intricate structure of
this new market presently remains a mystery. This paper sheds
light on competition and cooperation behavior of dissimilar aerial
mmWave access suppliers, concurrently employing licensed and
license-exempt frequency bands, by modeling it as a vertically
differentiated market where customers have varying preferences
in price and quality. To understand viable service provider
strategies, we begin with constructing the Nash equilibrium
for the initial market competition by employing the Bertrand
and Cournot games. We then conduct a unique assessment of
short-term market dynamics, where two licensed-band service
providers may cooperate to improve their competition positions
against the unlicensed-band counterpart intruding the market.
Our unprecedented analysis studies the effects of various market
interactions, price-driven demand evolution, and dynamic profit
balance in this novel type of ecosystem.
Index Terms—5G systems, mmWave technology, aerial access
points, competition and cooperation behavior, vertically differen-
tiated market, Bertrand and Cournot models, dynamic games.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
A. 5G standardization update
The global research on fifth generation (5G) radio access
systems has essentially been completed and the respective
standardization has actively begun. In light of the recently
published IMT vision for 2020 and beyond [1], there is
now a common consensus that 5G will address scenarios
that have difficulty to be served with existing technology,
including massive, ultra-reliable, and low latency machine type
communications [2], as well as enhanced mobile broadband
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(eMBB) use cases [3]. For over 4 billion of mobile subscribers
in the world, the latter promises to deliver the peak data rates
of 10 Gbit/s, which is 100x growth over the corresponding
figures in fourth generation (4G) networks.
However, this radical improvement over 4G technology is
difficult to materialize without moving up in frequency to
harness nontraditional millimeter wave (mmWave) spectrum.
Indeed, compared to today’s ultra-high frequencies, which
comprise only about 1 percent of all regulated spectrum [4],
mmWave band is plentiful and remains lightly licensed [5].
Therefore, it could be made available to service operators
worldwide, further facilitated by the fact that mmWave fre-
quencies should be 10-100x cheaper per Hz than the conven-
tional spectrum below 3 GHz [6]. Hence, mmWave systems
may bring along over an order of magnitude increase in
capacity even for the existing 4G cell densities [7].
Driven by IEEE 802.11ad and emerging 802.11ay spec-
ifications, unlicensed mmWave bands at 60 GHz become
increasingly employed by commercial Wi-Fi products [8]. For
licensed cellular use, the attractive candidates are 28, 39,
and 72 GHz [5], and 3GPP accelerate their efforts to ratify
a new, non-backward compatible, radio access technology
(RAT) operating in mmWave frequencies. The development of
this 5G New RAT comprises Phase I (by Sept 2018) optimized
primarily for the eMBB scenarios, which then opens door
to Phase II (by Dec 2019) supporting all 5G use cases [1].
Therefore, already in 2018-2019 we expect to see the early
commercial deployments of the ”initial” New RAT operating
in frequencies under 40 GHz.
B. Dynamic 5G access infrastructure
The rapid developments in 5G standards provide service
operators with efficient means to deploy ultra-dense networks
in mmWave bands [9], which cope better with the unprece-
dented acceleration in global mobile traffic demand that is
about doubling every year. However, throughout the 40 years
of its history, the cellular industry has primarily relied on static
radio access network (RAN) deployments. This has led to
rigid, fixed network architectures, where it takes a long time
to deploy additional access points due to lack of available
sites and cumbersome installation procedures. Hence, service
providers are actively seeking for alternative technologies and
system design options that enable non-rigid placement of
access nodes to better accommodate the varying space-time
user demand [10].
It has recently been understood that autonomous flying
robots, nicknamed drones, have the potential to quickly de-
ar
X
iv
:1
60
8.
04
94
3v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
7 A
ug
 20
16
2ploy dedicated communication networks [11], thus bringing
access supply to where the demand actually is. Facilitated by
miniaturization and cost reduction of electronic components,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and low-altitude platforms
(LAPs) equipped with wireless transceivers may soon lay the
foundation for truly dynamic RAN solutions [12]. Subject to
suitable regulatory frameworks, they can not only augment
wireless capacity and coverage by meshing with conventional
RAN systems and dynamically ”patching” them where needed,
but also share infrastructure with cargo delivery drones thus
bridging across transportation and communication markets.
Owing to their agility and mobility, rapidly deployable
drone small cells (or simply drone cells) will be particularly
useful in 5G networks during unexpected and temporary
events, such as large-scale mass outdoor happenings that create
unpredictable access demand fluctuations. The examples of
such scenarios, as envisioned by [13], include an open air
festival or a marathon use case with very high densities of
users and their connected handheld, wearable devices that
altogether produce huge amounts of aggregated traffic. In such
areas of interest where conventional RAN infrastructure may
be sparse and under-dimensioned, aerial access systems can
urgently assist the existing cellular networks by offering the
much needed capacity boost.
Fundamentally, the use of drone cells for ”on-demand”
RAN densification might in the future lead to very different
dimensioning of our networks where they are no longer
planned for peak loads, but instead provisioned for median
loading. Many important challenges have already been re-
solved to advance this thinking [14], [15], and in fact Google
has recently announced their strategy to offer aerial wireless
access in emerging markets1. Inspired by these promising
scientific, technological, and business advances, in this work
we put forward the vision of aerial mmWave access networks
employing mmWave RAT in high demand and overloaded
situations. We argue that mmWave technology is particularly
attractive for aerial access due to a number of factors, such as
simpler air interface design exploiting large bandwidths [16]
and higher chances of having a line-of-sight link to the user on
the ground, which is crucial for efficient mmWave operation.
As follows from the above, aerial mmWave access systems
may soon deliver very high spectral efficiencies and ultra-
broadband service experience, hence attracting various oper-
ators to leverage the cheaper mmWave spectrum. However,
the structure of this unprecedented market is not nearly well
understood and remains in prompt need of a comprehensive re-
search perspective. Fortunately, the broad field of game theory
supplies us with a rich set of tools to address its dynamics and
study the intricate interactions between the existing players
that may want to adapt their respective business strategies
as well as the new market stakeholders. We continue with
a review of our selected game theoretic mechanisms in what
follows.
1Alan Weissberger, ”Google’s Internet Access for Emerging Markets”
C. Game theory for aerial mmWave market
The ongoing evolution of wireless networks fueled by
the recent advent of novel access technologies and complex
heterogeneous architectures calls for applying advanced game
theoretic tools to help design and model the appropriate 5G-
ready solutions [17]. We are convinced that the emerging
5G mmWave access market structure and interactions remain
a vastly unexplored area as of today. Accordingly, various
market players concurrently employing licensed and license-
exempt mmWave spectrum will have to take into account the
evolved expectations of their customers when offering new
services. Therefore, we target a careful modeling of viable
business strategies in the aerial mmWave access market by
systematically bringing into focus the aspects of the quality of
service (QoS) and pricing, mindful of customer preferences.
Fig. 1. Our motivating scenario with 5G drone cells.
Our first line of research considers a duopoly setting where
two licensed-band service providers (LSPs) enter the aerial
mmWave access market and compete with each other to max-
imize their profits (see Fig. 1). In the past, market competition
and pricing models have already attracted significant attention
across the wireless community, as reported in [18] and [19].
To the best of our knowledge, however, no prior contribution
in existing literature on game theory has been considering
vertical differentiation in the context of wireless networking
where market players differentiate their products in terms of
quality, as was studied in [20], [21], and [22].
This methodology is particularly interesting for the purposes
of our analysis since [20] showed that for some parameters
the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium at which
only two players enter the market. Furthermore, these two
suppliers choose to offer differentiated products and earn
positive profits at equilibrium (if the production costs are
disregarded). Different from the work in [20], we assume
that the LSPs have already decided to enter the market and
are instead interested in defining the optimal quality of their
products as well as the corresponding prices/quantities [23].
3Therefore, our methodology at its initial stage studies mar-
ket equilibria in which the LSPs first determine the specifica-
tion of their offered products (i.e., mobile subscriptions) and
then decide on the prices or the quantities of the products
they sell according to a Bertrand or a Cournot competition
model, respectively [24]. Another finding of this paper is in
understanding how the outcome of the initial LSP competition
is influenced by the customer preferences (so-called taste
parameter) willing to pay more or less for a higher quality
product. After this is done, we introduce another entity into our
system, an unlicensed-band service provider (USP) operating
in free-to-use mmWave spectrum, and then study the dynamics
of the resulting market.
At the dynamic stage of our considered game, the customers
are allowed to prefer the USP to the LSP for wireless access
services, while previously inactive users can activate to con-
nect to the USP. The decision strategy of the customers is
tightly coupled with their individual utility perception, and
the resulting user decisions determine the strategy revision
protocol [25]. The latter is captured in our methodology as
a combination of different subjective and social factors, such
as ”curiosity”, ”dissatisfaction”, and ”gossiping”. In practice,
the competing market players attempt to find countermeasures
against customer decisions that might penalize their profits.
While for the USP we model its ability to adapt the offered
price over time according to the user choices, the LSPs do not
have such luxury as they are bound by a long-term contractual
agreement with their customers.
Correspondingly, the LSPs have to seek ways to maximize
the chances of meeting their service-level agreements (SLAs)
and thus prevent users from changing the provider in the
long run. To this aim, we advocate the adoption of long-
term cooperative agreements between the LSPs to improve the
QoS perception levels for their customers. Such cooperation
is particularly helpful if a customer could be served by an
assisting LSP at much higher spectral efficiency. Our analysis
shows that these forms of cooperation between the LSPs
improve their profits as compared to the non-cooperative case.
Then, the question is how to share the surplus among the coop-
erating players, which requires fairness-centric game theoretic
solutions [26]. In this work, we adopt the widely-accepted
Shapley value [27] for its intrinsic capability to capture the
contributions of individual players in a coalition [28].
Finally, we note that market evolution and price dynamics
were investigated in other contexts as well, including hetero-
geneous small cell networks [29] and advanced offloading
techniques [30]. Evolutionary games [31], [32] have also
been receiving attention in the literature, with applications to
competing wireless operators [33] and user groups sharing
the limited access bandwidth [34]. In contrast to the past
work, our game formulations uniquely study the evolution
of market shares for two LSPs and one USP – the minimal
feasible set of players in the subject market – according to the
customer decisions as well as the ability of the USP to adapt its
pricing strategy over time. Technically, we construct a system
of differential equations that characterize the dynamics of our
market by analyzing the situations when the LSPs avoid or
enter into cooperation while competing with the USP.
D. Contributions of this work
We envision that the aerial mmWave access technologies
will play a pivotal role in the emerging 5G market. To
leverage their full potential, they will need to be accompanied
by new powerful methodologies able to capture the intricate
market dynamics and characterize the practical benefits for
all the involved stakeholders. In this paper, we offer the
first comprehensive attempt to analyze and understand the
competition and cooperation behavior of dissimilar players
within this novel ecosystem, which boils down to the following
four major contributions.
1) Initial market formulation. We introduce viable strate-
gies of the LSPs (licensed-band service providers) when
operating in the new market of the aerial mmWave
access systems. A vertically differentiated market is
comprehensively modeled where two LSPs first deter-
mine the specification of their offered services, and then
decide on the prices or the quantities of the services they
offer according to the Bertrand or Cournot competition
models. Our proposed formulation enables a valuable
comparison of the equilibrium points established with
the two considered initial games.
2) Analysis of market dynamics. We construct an un-
precedented analytical framework that captures the
short-term market dynamics featuring dissimilar play-
ers, two LSPs and one USP (unlicensed-band service
provider) as the latter enters the subject market. Our
dynamic game theoretic methodology allows to carefully
follow the cooperative interactions between the LSPs
and their competition against the USP counterpart, as
well as thoroughly characterize both price- and sociality-
driven evolution of customer preferences when making
the service provider selection.
3) Numerical performance evaluation. We systematically
report important numerical results for the considered
market players under the realistic assumptions on the
mmWave channel modeling, signal propagation, and
aerial access point (AAP) operation. Our findings open
door to an exciting technology innovation when two
AAPs belonging to different LSPs serve customers in
cooperation, thus allowing to share the access infras-
tructure between multiple operators. A detailed study
of temporal evolution in market shares and resulting
profits is delivered for both the Bertrand and Cournot
competition models.
4) Large-scale system-level validation. We verify our
extensive analytical results with in-depth system-level
simulations that are grounded in reality and constructed
after the meaningful real-world scenarios. The employed
simulation platform integrates considerable knowledge
behind the principles of mmWave system operation as
well as employs substantiated and adequate assumptions
on the AAP deployment behavior. The simulation results
are made available to validate the core assumptions of
our proposed analytical framework, assess the true mar-
ket dynamics, and support the key practical learnings.
4II. PROPOSED SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we outline the considered system as well as
introduce its main assumptions.
A. Scenario of interest
We focus on an open air, densely crowded scenario (e.g.,
a festival or any other outdoor event) within a certain area
of interest, where participants are located on the ground. The
mobile devices of these people – potentially active in terms
of wireless access – are equipped with radio transceivers and
are able to operate on either licensed or unlicensed mmWave
frequencies.
Assumption 1. For the purposes of mmWave channel model-
ing, we represent a human body as a cylinder of height hb and
diameter 2rb, and further assume that positions of the centers
of cylinders are spatially distributed with the density of µ.
We note that not all of our mass event participants may use
mmWave radios and also assume a certain share of potentially
active ones, termed customers. Further, the average elevation
of the mobile devices equals hd, and the projections of the
active devices on the ground are also spatially distributed with
the respective density of µ0 << µ.
Mobile devices of customers on the ground may be served
by aerial mmWave access points (or drone cells) that belong
to a certain owner (i.e., service provider). These flying access
nodes may be deployed temporarily within the area of interest
to support very high but relatively short-term connectivity
demand on the ground during the event in question.
Assumption 2. We assume that Ni AAPs (aerial access
points) within a certain service provider’s deployment i
(termed here a fleet) are identical, uniformly placed over the
area, keep the same altitude hi, and operate over the spectrum
bandwidth Bi. An AAP may serve a customer’s device with a
beam of half-angle φ (half of aperture), which is directed at
the inclination angle β ≤ βmax, where βmax < pi/2 follows
from physical restrictions (i.e., the angle between the vertical
and the beam cone axes cannot exceed a certain maximum).
If a certain device is associated with the fleet i based
on a particular customer agreement (the agreements are all
indivisible and mutually exclusive), it will be served by the
closest AAP of the corresponding fleet. Let us consider a link
of the tagged device associated with the fleet i. We assume
that one of the following alternative situations may take place
(see e.g., [14]):
• there is line-of-sight (LOS) propagation between the
device and the corresponding AAP,
• the device is blocked by the body of its owner or another
person, but there still exists a sufficiently strong path for
the reflected beam,
• the device is fully blocked and thus has no usable
connection to the AAP.
In order to address the above options, we introduce the
following assumptions.
Assumption 3. Signal propagates according to a free-space
model and hence, depending on the link between the AAP and
the device, the received power at distance d ≤ h tanβmax may
assume one of the following values:
prx = ptxGa
Gi
h2+d2 , if LOS exists,
prx = ptxGNLOSGa
Gi
h2+d2 , if no LOS, but signal is reflected,
prx = 0, if no signal at all,
(1)
where ptx is the fixed transmit power, Ga = 21−cosφ is the
antenna gain, Gi =
(
c
4pifi
)2
is a path gain constant, f
is the signal frequency, c = 3 · 108 is the speed of light.
Here, GNLOS is a constant decrease in signal power due to
reflection (additional attenuation factor as in [14]), which is
assumed to be fixed across the network.
Based on the received power, we may estimate the actual
throughput of the device connected to the AAP of the fleet
i and located at the distance d according to the Shannon’s
formula:
T = ∆Bi log2
(
1 +
prx
N0
)
, (2)
where N0 is the noise plus interference level and ∆Bi is a
share of effective bandwidth available to the link in question.
We assume that each device always uses the full channel
bandwidth (which may vary depending on the choice of a
provider), while the time is shared between all the connected
devices equally (e.g., as a result of the round-robin scheduling
as in [30]). Owing to the beamforming capability on the
mmWave AAPs, we can analyze our scenario as noise-limited,
and thus N0 is assumed constant.
Assumption 4. In addition, we assume that the number of
AAPs within each fleet is sufficient to cover the area of interest.
In particular, the distance between the two AAPs is 2RAAP,
RAAP ≤ h tanβmax. This readily implies a lower bound on
the number of AAPs (for a hexagonal grid):
Nmin =
⌈
R
2h tan βmax
+1−√2
⌉⌈
R
√
4
3
2h tan βmax+1−
√
8
3
⌉
+
+
⌊⌈
R
√
4
3
2h tan βmax+1−
√
8
3
⌉⌋
.
(3)
The above expression (or similar, depending on selected
deployment) is merely an example and may be obtained based
on straightforward geometric reasoning; thus, we omit its
derivation here to save space.
B. Main players and their interactions
In this work, we differentiate between the following three
types of players in our system: (i) multiple customers demand-
ing service, (ii) two LSPs (licensed-band service providers)
operating in licensed mmWave spectrum and ”supposedly”
responsible for the announced QoS, and (iii) one USP
(unlicensed-band service provider) operating in free-to-use un-
licensed mmWave frequencies and aiming to offer best-effort
service. The interactions of interest between these players also
belong to the following three types:
5A. A tagged customer may be served by its own LSP
paying a fixed price pi, i = 1, 2 (per unit time). For
that matter, the LSP provides the customer with a
mobile subscription (e.g., a SIM-card) in advance,
where the choice of an LSP is made based on the
individual customer preferences (see below).
B. Another alternative for the customer is to be served
by the USP paying a dynamic price p0(t). We note
that all of our devices with mmWave radios may be
served by the USP, including those that do not have
an LSP subscription provided in advance.
C. Finally, an LSP may request assistance from another
LSP and utilize its infrastructure to serve a certain
customer e.g., if the latter is geometrically closer
to other provider’s AAP (see Fig. 2 for details). In
this case, the served customer is unaware of such
cooperation and continues to pay its regular price
pi, i = 1, 2. The LSPs may share the resulting surplus
according to a certain partitioning model e.g., using
the Shapley vector [27].
Fig. 2. Cooperation between service providers: mutual assistance of the LSPs.
C. Strategies and payoffs
Below we discuss the strategies and the corresponding
payoffs of our three types of players.
1) Both LSPs aim to support the desired QoS and keep
their subscribers satisfied. To do so, one LSP may
offload some of its customers (connections) to another
LSP, and thus have them served on its own spectrum, but
using the airtime of the assisting LSP. In such a situation,
the assisting LSP’s infrastructure will effectively act as
a ”proxy” AAP.
Strategy of the LSP i includes offering prices pi per
unit time for its customers as well as announcing a
certain QoS (e.g., throughput) at the initial stage of the
market game.
2) USP’s profit comprises the fees paid by all of its
customers (potentially including former customers of
either LSP and those without the LSP subscriptions).
Strategy of the USP includes offering price p0(t) for
providing best-effort service to its customers.
3) Each of N active customers aims at maximizing its util-
ity U(T, p), that is, a function of price and experienced
throughput.
Strategy of a customer includes choosing a service
provider (e.g., its own LSP, if applicable, or the USP).
Accordingly, a customer may prefer its own LSP (in case
a SIM-card has been purchased in advance) or connect
to the USP instead.
D. Customer’s preferences
In contrast to most past work, we assume in this paper that
customers are not identical in their preferences, which con-
veniently reflects their different financial capabilities, tastes,
or priorities. We thus consider a vertically differentiated
market [35], where potential customers agree on ranking
diverse products (in our case, mmWave access offers) in the
order of quality preference according to some utility function.
However, their willingness to pay remains variable due to e.g.,
budget restrictions.
Assumption 5. In our scenario, we introduce the following
utility function:
U(θ, T, p) = θ · s(T )− p, (4)
where s is an increasing quality function determined by the
throughput T that the customer may observe while making a
decision (i.e., either announced by the provider at the initial
stage or actually experienced during operation), p is the price
per airtime, and θ is the taste parameter [23]. The latter is a
typical measure of the buyer’s preference in the differentiated
markets. The higher its taste parameter is, the more a customer
is willing to pay for a better quality service. Generally, zero
utility value corresponds to not buying the product, and thus if
U(θ, T, p) ≤ 0, then a customer would decide to refrain from
purchasing the mmWave access service. We assume that θ is
distributed within the interval [0, θmax] according to a certain
probability density hθ(θ).
Our customers are rational, that is, they always make
decisions targeting the better utility value. Here, zero utility
corresponds to the situation when a customer decides not to
connect, while zero lower bound on θ implies that there always
exists someone who decides not to connect at all (i.e., we
assume that our setup is not ”covered market” in order to be
able to apply the Cournot competition model further on).
E. Customer quality estimation function
We continue by discussing the shape of the function s(T ),
which reflects the dependence of customer service satisfaction
levels on the throughput: announced (expected) or realistic
(experienced). Building on our supportive analysis of today’s
mobile data offers (3G/4G) across the leading network oper-
ators in the US and Europe (see Table I), we conclude that
6TABLE I
PRICE PER UNIT THROUGHPUT: COMPARING SELECTED PROVIDERS.
Operator a b c R-coefficient
AT&T (US)1 16.35 -0.0273 6.7120 0.9997
Verizon (US)2 41.99 0.5793 3.3980 0.9997
T-Mobile (Germany)3 12.50 2.175e-08 3.7500 1.0000
Vodafone (UK)4 12.95 0.1134 2.3690 1.0000
Orange (France)5 10.80 1.6000 2.0000 1.0000
Telecom Italia (Italy)6 19.69 2.5000 0.6250 1.0000
DNA (Finland)7 12.36 0.5619 0.1216 1.0000
1 https://www.att.com/shop/wireless/plans/planconfigurator.html
2 http://www.verizonwireless.com/landingpages/cell-phone-plans/
3 http://www.t-mobile.com/cell-phone-plans/mobile-internet.html
4 https://www.vodafone.co.uk/shop/bundles-and-sims/sim-only-deals/
5 http://boutique.orange.fr/tablette-et-cle/forfaits-internet-let-s-go
6 https://www.tim.it/offerte/mobile/internet-da-tablet-e-pc
the price per unit throughput follows exactly the same law
across a wide range of larger and smaller providers alike,
which implies:
p
T =
a
T+b + c. (5)
The above follows from the appropriate curve fitting and
the corresponding regression parameters as well as the values
of R-coefficient are shown in Table I.
Assumption 6. Since the user utility is assumed to be linear
with respect to the price as well as the quality s(T ), we impose
that s(T ) has a similar structure to what service providers use
in real markets. Accordingly, our quality s(T ) translates into:
s(T ) = aTT+b + cT, (6)
where a, b, and c are the coefficients that e.g., may be taken
from Table I.
Without loss of generality, we note that the coefficient a
could be included into θ, and the coefficient c is then rescaled
correspondingly. This effectively means that the maximum
price, which a customer is ready to pay for a certain quality
T is pθmax = θa · ( TT+b + c˜T ), and a is then incorporated into
θ˜ = θa. Therefore, the upper border of taste θmax yields a
limit on price, where price θ˜max · ( TT+b + cT ) is the lowest
among those leading to zero demand. In what follows, we omit
tilde over θ for improved readability.
III. INITIAL STAGE OF OUR GAME FORMULATION
A. General remarks
We decompose our subsequent modeling into two consec-
utive parts, which are the (i) initial-stage game formulation
where two LSPs divide the market in advance and (ii) dy-
namic game development after the USP enters the market in
equilibrium.
1) Initial stage: At the initial, long-term stage, only two
major players (the LSP 1 and the LSP 2) are participating in a
differentiated market game with two phases: first, deciding on
the maximum quality level to attract customers and second,
competing in price or, alternatively, in quantity. We consider
both price and quantity competitions as they lead to different
equilibrium points, and there is still no consensus in current
literature as to which type of competition is preferred. At the
point of equilibrium, a certain share D1 ∈ (0, 1) of customers
have purchased subscriptions (SIM-cards) of the LSP 1, while
D2 ∈ (0, 1−D1) have acquired SIM-cards of the LSP 2. The
remaining customers may be not connected to either LSP, since
our setting is not a ”covered market”. We briefly summarize
the above as:
• Players: two LSPs.
• Strategies: first – qualities, then – prices/quantities.
• Payoff: utility of each LSP (subscriber payments minus
costs).
2) Dynamic stage: At the second, short-term stage, a new
market player (the USP) is intruding the system where the
LSPs operate at the equilibrium point. The USP announces
its dynamic price p0(t) at time moment t. Based on their
utility function, customers of the LSP i may decide to prefer
the USP, while previously non-participating customers (having
share y0 ∈ [0, 1 − D1 − D2]) may connect only to the USP.
Our system tracks the shares x1, x2, y0, y1, and y2, where xi
correspond to customers currently utilizing service of the LSP
i, and yi denotes those who change their LSP i for the USP.
We assume that every customer of the LSP i is aware of both
prices p0(t) and pi as well as knows its current throughput
(T0(t) or Ti(t)). Further, customers are able to interact with
each other (owing to their close proximity within the area of
interest) and hence may imitate strategies of others (see e.g.,
[33]). In our scenario, a customer of the LSP i or USP with the
taste θ decides to inquire another customer from the potential
group of the USP or LSP j about the experienced service
quality. Based on the received information Tj , the tagged cus-
tomer calculates its own potential utility U(θ; s(Tj), pj) and,
if the potential service is better than the current one, changes
its service provider with the probability that is proportional to
the difference U(θ; s(Tj), pj)− U(θ; s(Ti), pi).
Summarizing, the considered dynamic game may be de-
scribed by:
• Players: USP and the customers.
• Strategies: p0(t) for the USP and service provider selec-
tion for the customers.
• Population state: shares of the customers (y0, y1, y2).
• Payoff: utility of the USP (pure profit) and utility of the
customers.
The overall structure of the dynamic game is illustrated in
Fig. 3.
B. Profits of the LSPs at the initial stage
First, two LSPs play a two-stage game to divide the market
and set the optimal quantity or price (here, we do not consider
the market entry stage [36] for the LSPs). For the sake of
further comparison, we model both alternatives: price setting
and quantity setting types of competition, which are known
in the literature as Bertrand and Cournot competition models,
correspondingly. In this work, we analyze both game types in
order to reveal the dependence of the results on the optimal
choice of LSP strategies, namely, whether LSPs eventually
offer a homogeneous product (as shown by the Cournot model)
or two differentiated products (as illustrated by the Bertrand
7Fig. 3. Interactions in our considered dynamic game.
model). Since both situations may happen in the real market,
one model cannot be preferred over another.
At the first stage, both LSPs select the offered level of
quality. We recall that quality is characterized by a data rate
package with provisionally announced maximum throughput
Tmi , i = 1, 2, and the LSPs are aware of each other, but make
their decisions sequentially. At the second, competitive stage,
in the Bertrand game the LSPs decide on the prices pi, i =
1, 2 that will be announced to the customers purchasing their
SIM-cards (a mutually exclusive choice is assumed here, that
is, either a SIM-card of the LSP 1 or that of the LSP 2).
In contrast to that, in the Cournot game the LSPs decide on
quantity, which in our scenario translates into the number of
subscribed customers or, equivalently, sold SIM-cards.
Making its decisions at both stages, an LSP aims to maxi-
mize its profit. Clearly, the LSP income is determined by the
financial flow from the previously subscribed and presently
served customers, but to define the rest of the profit function
we need to clarify the structure of the costs. Clearly, the
advertised service quality may not be matching the real quality,
which uninformed customers face after purchasing the product.
However, in our scenario, maintaining subscription (loyalty)
to a certain LSP in a long run is equivalent to a ”repeat
purchase”. Therefore, sellers are highly motivated in keeping
their subscribed customers satisfied, as inspired by theory of
advertising in [37], [38]. To reflect this motivation analyti-
cally, we introduce the following assumption responsible for
handling the costs of the LSPs.
Assumption 7. We assume linear costs of improvement in the
claimed quality si per user, so that an LSP would be ready
to support it for its served customers. Hence, the total costs
depend both on the number of served devices and on the
announced Tmi . The latter reflects the initial investments into
a fixed-term spectrum lease and/or the amounts of spectrum
that could be resold (as e.g., in [39] or [19]) or, otherwise,
rented.
In fact, the dependence of costs is not linear on the required
throughput, because in practice not all of the customers are
active simultaneously and the resources of the LSPs are
carefully provisioned. Moreover, the quality function s(T ) has
a non-linear component TT+b , which, however, has less impact
than the linear term cT and can be omitted for the sake of
tractability of further analysis. Therefore, our proposed profit
function is given by:
Πi(s1, s2, p1, p2) = Di(s1, s2, p1, p2) (pi − νsi) , (7)
where Di(s1, s2, p1, p2) is a demand for the LSP i, and ν is a
”quality cost coefficient”. The latter may be roughly estimated
from the value of the spectrum license costs to support the
announced QoS, normalized by unit time as well as the total
number of customers in the country of interest.
C. Demands for the LSPs at the initial stage
To establish the Nash equilibrium of our game at its
initial stage, we exploit the powerful principles of backward
induction. Assuming that the levels of quality si = s(Tmi )
(or, equivalently, the levels of the announced throughput Tmi )
are fixed, we first obtain the equilibrium for the Bertrand
price game and the Cournot quantity game. Without loss of
generality, we may assume that s1 ≥ s2 (Tm1 ≥ Tm2 ), and
hence p1 ≥ p2, since the sellers are targeting the rational
customers, and we consider one-dimensional product differ-
entiation (otherwise, equation (4) would contain additional
components related to other criteria [40]).
Following [23], and based on the fixed price and quality
levels, we determine the following points of indifference for
a tagged customer:
• point of indifference to buying or not buying the service
of the LSP 1 is denoted by the parameter θ∅,2 = p2s2
(follows from U(θ, s1, p1) = 0),
• point of indifference to buying the service of the LSP 1
or the LSP 2 corresponds to the parameter θ1,2 = p1−p2s1−s2
(follows from U(θ, s1, p1) = U(θ, s2, p2)).
Therefore, the corresponding demands may be written as:
D1(s1, s2, p1, p2) =
θmax∫
θ1,2
h(θ)dθ = H(θmax)−H(θ1,2),
D2(s1, s2, p1, p2) =
θ1,2∫
θ∅,2
h(θ)dθ = H(θ1,2)−H(θ∅,2),
(8)
where h(θ) and H(θ) are the PDF and the CDF of the taste
parameter θ, respectively. In what follows, we consider the
Bertrand price competition and the Cournot quantity compe-
tition models separately.
D. Bertrand price competition
In the Bertrand game, the LSPs choose prices p1 and p2
in order to maximize their profits Πi = Di (pi − νsi) for the
selected quality function values s1 and s2.
Assumption 8. For the purposes of illustration in this paper,
we only consider a uniform distribution of the taste parameter
h(θ) = 1θmax , θ ∈ [0, θmax]. In case of more than one player
in the market, if h(θ) is not uniform, we may experience mul-
tiple symmetric equilibria [36], which could be investigated
separately and may thus generalize the results of this paper
in subsequent studies.
8Differentiating Πi over pi, one may calculate the optimal
prices (can be verified for ν = 0 by [23]) for the fixed levels
of quality:
p1 = s1
ν(2s1−s2)+2θmax(s1−s2)
(4s1−s2) , p2 = s2
3νs1+θmax(s1−s2)
(4s1−s2) ,
(9)
where s1 = s(Tm1 ), s2 = s(T
m
2 ). This derivation is trivial and
is based on finding points where the gradient of Πi is zero.
Then, the profit function is given as:
Π1(s1, s2) = 4s
2
1
(θmax−ν)2(s1−s2)
θmax(4s1−s2)2 ,
Π2(s1, s2) = s1
(θmax−ν)(−4νs1+θmaxs2)(s1−s2)
θmax(4s1−s2)2 .
(10)
The first-order condition of maximum for the above opti-
mization functions may be further written as follows:
∂Π1
∂s1
= 4s1(θmax − ν)2 4s
2
1−3s1s2+2s22
θmax(4s1−s2)3 = 0,
∂Π2
∂s2
= s21(θmax − ν)2 4s1−7s2θmax(4s1−s2)3 = 0.
(11)
Denoting s1s2 as x, we may then locate the maximum points
for both LSPs. We note that due to the absence of roots for
the first equation and the fact that ∂Π1∂s1 > 0, the maximum
is located at the border s∗1 = smax, while the optimal quality
s∗2 = smaxξ, where ξ = 4/7 (the second-order condition of
maximum ∂
2Π2
∂s22
∣∣∣
s∗1 ,s
∗
2
< 0 could be verified easily). Hence, we
have established a candidate solution for the Bertrand game
(here, θmax > ν should hold).
Proposition 1. The obtained solution for the Bertrand game
is the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is fairly straightforward and is based on
demonstrating that the following holds:
Πi(s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ Πi(s1, s∗2), for any s1 < s∗1,
and Πi(s∗1, s
∗
2) ≥ Πi(s∗1, s2), for any s2 6= s∗2. (12)
Substituting the sought point (smax, smaxξ) into the price,
demand, and profit function, we may also obtain the indicators,
which are collected altogether in Table II. Then, we addition-
ally calculate the consumer surplus, which may be derived
as:
CS =
θmax∫
θ1,2
(θs1 − p1) 1θmax dθ +
θ1,2∫
θ∅,2
(θs2 − p2) 1θmax dθ =
=
2s21s2(ν−θ)2(3ν+θ)
3(4s1−s2)2θ2(2ν+θ) .
(13)
E. Cournot quality competition
While in the Bertrand market the price pi is controlled by
the LSP i and the share of connected users is then determined
through the demand function, in the Cournot market the LSPs
control the quantity (i.e., the number of users) and then the
prices are derived through the inverted system of demand
functions:
p1(s1, s2, D1, D2) = −θ(D1s1 − s1 +D2s2),
p2(s1, s2, D1, D2) = −θs2(D1 +D2 − 1). (14)
Substituting the above into the expression for the LSP
profit, we may establish the quantity response functions that
maximize the profit for the fixed qualities s1, s2 based on the
following first-order conditions:
∂Π1
∂D1
= −θ(2D1s1 − s1 +D2s2)− νs1,
∂Π2
∂D2
= −θs2(D1 + 2D2 − 1)− νs2.
Therefore, the sought demand functions that maximize the
LSP profit are given by:
D1(s1, s2) =
(θmax−ν)(2s1−s2)
θmax(4s1−s2) , D2(s1, s2) =
(θmax−ν)s1
θmax(4s1−s2) .
Substituting these demand functions into (14), we obtain the
prices set by the LSPs:
p1 =
θs1(2s1−s2)+2νs21
4s1−s2 , p2 =
θs1s2+ν(3s1−s2)
4s1−s2
and, correspondingly, capture the resulting profit:
Π1(s1, s2)=
θs1(2s1−s2)2(θmax−ν)2
θmax(4s1−s2)2 ,Π2(s1, s2)=
θs21s2(θmax−ν)2
θmax(4s1−s2)2 .
(15)
In the second stage of backward induction, we derive the
optimal level of qualities that maximize the profit (15) by
finding the stationary points of the following equations:
∂Π1(s1,s2)
∂s1
= (θmax − ν)2 4s1(4s
2
1−3s1s22+s32)
4s1−s2)3 ,
∂Π2(s1,s2)
∂s2
= (θmax − ν)2 s
2
1(4s1+s2)
θmax(4s1−s2)3 .
(16)
Denoting s1/s2 as x, we may conclude that there exists
no solution x > 1 for (16). Since both ∂Π1(s1,s2)∂s1 and
∂Π2(s1,s2)
∂s2
> 0, the point of maximum is located at the right
border of the interval for s, that is, s∗1 = smax and s
∗
2 = smax.
The final prices, profits, as well as points of indifference are
easy to verify and are summarized in Table II. Therefore, we
have established a candidate solution for the Cournot game
and can formulate a proposition similar to the one before as
follows.
Proposition 2. The obtained solution for the Cournot game
is the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is easy to derive similarly to that of the
above proposition for the Bertrand game.
Since the Cournot prices and qualities are equivalent, two
LSPs divide the subject market in equal proportions, if we
assume that there is no weighted preference towards a certain
brand. Hence, the consumer surplus in this case may be defined
as:
CS =
θmax∫
θ1,2
(θs1 − p1) 1θmax dθ =
7s21s2(ν−θmax)2(12ν+5θ)
12(4s1−s2)2θ2max(7ν+5θ) .
(17)
Finally, the difference between the Bertrand and the Cournot
games with respect to the consumer surplus equals:
CSBertrand − CSCournot = 5s
2
1s2(ν−θ)2(10ν+θ)
24θ(4s1−s2)2(14ν2+9νθ+θ2) > 0.
(18)
As a result of all the above derivations, we obtain the divided
(albeit not covered) market at time moment t = 0, which is
illustrated in Fig. 4. In the figure, the upper part corresponds
to our static initial solution.
9Fig. 4. Illustration of our considered vertically differentiated market.
TABLE II
COMPARING OUR INITIAL GAME SOLUTIONS FOR VARIOUS SCENARIOS.
Game type Bertrand Cournot
Quality of LSP 12 s s
Quality of LSP 2 0.5714s s
Point θ∅,2 0.8750ν + 0.125θ 0.6667ν + 0.3333θ
Point θ1,2 0.5833ν + 0.4167θ 0.6667ν + 0.3333θ
Profit of LSP 1 0.1458s (θ−ν)
2)
θ
0.1111s
(θ−ν)2
θ
Profit of LSP 2 0.0208s (θ−ν)(θ−7.0ν)
θ
0.1111s
(θ−ν)2
θ
Aggregate MP3 0.1667s (7ν
2+4θ2−11νθ)
4θ
0.2222s
(θ−ν)2
θ
Price of LSP 1 0.2500s(3ν + θ) 0.3333s(2ν + θ)
Price of LSP 2 0.0714s(7ν + θ) 0.3333s(2ν + θ)
Costs of LSP 1 0.5833νs (θ−ν)
θ
0.3333νs
(θ−ν)
θ
Costs of LSP 2 0.1667νs (θ−ν)
θ
0.3333νs
(θ−ν)
θ
Demand of LSP 1 0.5833 (θ−ν)
θ
0.3333
(θ−ν)
θ
Demand of LSP 2 0.2917 (θ−ν)
θ
0.3333
(θ−ν)
θ
Total demand 0.8750 (θ−ν)
θ
0.6667
(θ−ν)
θ
CS 2s
2
1s2(ν−θ)2(3ν+θ)
3(4s1−s2)2θ2(2ν+θ)
7s21s2(ν−θ)2(12ν+5θ)
12(4s1−s2)2θ2(7ν+5θ)
1 Cooperative strategy in Cournot game (both LSPs maximize total profit).
2 For brevity, θ = θmax, s = smax.
3 Market profit.
IV. DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT OF GAME FORMULATION
In this subsection, we introduce a new player on the market,
namely, the USP. In our scenario, the USP enters the market
where the two LSPs are operating in equilibrium, for a short-
term period, thus distorting the balance. Assessing the changes
in the customer alignment picture constitutes the theoretical
target of this section. We note that in the considered market the
customers are differentiated by their experienced spectral effi-
ciency (due to the actual geometry of their locations) as well
as their preferences with respect to the price/throughput trade-
off (according to our assumption of vertically differentiated
market). To tackle the resulting complex and multidimensional
problem, we capture the system dynamics by averaging the
spectral efficiencies across the coverage areas of the AAPs,
which may be equivalent to characterizing customer mobility.
A. Dynamic setup and mmWave properties
In order to follow the dynamic evolution of customer utility,
we first focus on deriving the average spectral efficiency,
which is a function of the number of simultaneously served
customers per mmWave AAP. For that matter, we consider
a tagged AAP of the fleet i representing the average system
behavior within this fleet. Owing to the flexibility of drone
cell deployment as well as minding our earlier assumption of
uniform AAP placement, we further assume that the coverage
area of this AAP may be approximated by a circle of radius
RAAP that is equal to a half of the distance between two
neighboring AAPs (as per Assumption 4):
RAAP =
R√
2+
⌈
R
2hi tan βmax
+1−√2
⌉
−1
. (19)
We note that the above has been derived by analogy
to (3) reflecting a particular considered deployment, and is
meant here to solely serve the purposes of radius estimation
illustration.
Assumption 9. Specifically, we assume that user devices
are distributed according to a Poisson Point Process (PPP)
with the density µ0, which has been introduced earlier in
Assumption 1.
Then, the number of devices per AAP may be calculated
as:
ni=µ0piR
2
AAPxi, i=1, 2, n0 =µ0piR
2
AAP(y0+y1+y2),
(20)
where xi, i = 1, 2 correspond to the shares of customers for
the LSPs and yi, i = 0, 1, 2 is the total share of customers for
the USP.
Assumption 10. For the sake of analytical tractability, we
replace random spectral efficiencies of the customers with a
spectral efficiency value averaged across the coverage area of
the tagged AAP.
Due to our PPP assumption, the distribution of distances d
to the AAP within a circle of radius RAAP equals fd(x) =
2x
R2AAP
. Therefore, the average spectral efficiency η(RAAP) may
be established by calculating the following integral:
η(RAAP) =
RAAP∫
0
log2 (1 + p˜(qLOS + qNLOSGNLOS))
2x
R2AAP
dx,
(21)
where p˜ = ptx GiGa(h2+d2)N0 for brevity, Gi is the path gain
defined in Assumption 3, Ga is the antenna gain, and the
probabilities of LOS/NLOS link have different nature by con-
trast to the conventional approach in [41]. These are derived
in Appendix and summarized here as:
qLOS(d) = e
−µd·2rb
(
hb−hd
h−hd
)
, if LOS exists,
qNLOS|no LOS(d) =
(
1− exp(−µpi(h tan (φ))2·cos(φ)√
cos2(φ)− d2
d2+h2
)
)
×
× (1− qLOS(d)) , if no LOS, NLOS exists.
(22)
The closed-form approximation is based on the fact that
E[f(x)] ≈ f(E[x]) and is given by:
η(RAAP) = log2
1 + ptx GiGa(qLOS+qNLOSGNLOS)(
h2+
(
2
3RAAP
)2)
N0
 , (23)
where the above numerical solution remains suitable for the
necessary further calculations. To assist in the process, Fig. 5
illustrates the changes in the slope of spectral efficiency as
averaged over a circle of varied radius for 28 and 60 GHz. It
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clearly indicates the impact of blockage at lower AAP altitudes
as well as shows the maximum distance to the receiver.
Fig. 5. Spectral efficiency averaged over a circle of varied radius.
B. USP market entry
In our formulation, the population state may be described by
the vector (y1, y2, y0), which denotes the shares of customers
connected to the USP, having purchased a SIM-card of the
LSP 1 and the LSP 2, correspondingly, or having no SIM-
card at all. Further, the shares of the customers actively using
the service by the LSPs may be derived directly from the
initial-stage demand x1(t) = D∗1 − y1(t), x2 = D∗2 − y1(t)
(we remind that the customers are not allowed to change their
SIM-cards during our dynamic short-term game).
Given the information on (y0(t), y1(t), y2(t)), the USP
attempts to make its optimal decision on the dynamic price
p0(t) that maximizes its total profit (in the absence of full
market information), which in turn directly depends on both
the number of connected customers and the price itself. For
the fixed price p0 and the estimated average actual throughput
BSP ηSP
y1+y2+y0
per customer, we may establish the USP profit as:
Π0 = p0(t)D0(t) = p0(t) (y0(t) + y1(t) + y2(t)) , (24)
where y0 denotes the proportion of the customers coming from
a previously inactive share of the market (those who did not
purchase any SIM-card before).
Further, let the USP be unaware of future customer behavior
and our hidden customer reaction functions, so that the USP
could not maximize (24) explicitly. Then, its heuristic choice
would be to react flexibly to the changes in the customer de-
mand. In particular, if the number of subscribers is decreasing,
then the USP lowers the price and vice versa. Therefore, the
stationary point for the price p(t) is defined by the constant
demand of the USP:
d(y0(t)+y1(t)+y2(t))
dt = 0. (25)
Further, we assume that the considered price dynamics set
by the USP satisfies the following equation:
dp
pdt = cprice
d(y0(t)+y1(t)+y2(t))
dt , (26)
that is, the relative increment of the USP price is proportional
to the increment in the number of currently served customers.
We note that the latter is adopted as one of the reasonable
examples where the USP acts rationally, and other USP
strategies may in principle be considered.
C. Decisions of the customers
In order to mimic customer decisions when there is a
choice between two utility values, we introduce the following
assumption:
Assumption 11. We assume that if there is a utility difference
of ∆U(θ) between its possible value and the current one, the
customer decides to change or imitate the strategy with the
probability:
pu (∆U(θ)) =
2
1+e−cu∆U(θ) − 1, for ∆U(θ) > 0. (27)
The above consideration tightly approximates the behavior of
customers with arbitrary levels of patience, as given by the
”impatience” coefficient cu. In particular, pu (0) = 0 (no
changes whatsoever) and pu (∆U →∞) = 1. This logistic
function is a convenient formulation to reflect the decision
making probability in the absence of the information on the
actual range of utility values within our game.
Modeling the customer behavior in more detail, we employ
a notion of proximity-based social interaction. Accordingly,
the customers do not know the actual quality of services they
had never used before, but they may ”talk” to other customers
with a certain degree of γ (could be regarded as a proximity-
based interaction possibility). It effectively means that at some
point of time the tagged customer may select another customer
from the alternative service group to inquire for its service
quality. When the USP announces the price p0(t) at the state
(y0, y1, y2), there could be three types of mutually exclusive
reactions of the LSP customers as follows.
1) Gossiping. At the moment t + ∆t, a customer of the
LSP i decides to assess its quality and thus inquires
someone connected to the USP, if any, with the proba-
bility γ. Knowing the alternative quality s(T0) at time t,
said customer may decide to change its current service
provider, if U(θ; s(T0), p0) > Ui(θ; s(Ti), pi) with the
probability pu(∆U(θ)). The corresponding probability
is defined as:
ξγ(y0 + y1 + y2)pu(U(θ; s0, p0)− U(θ; si, pi)) ,
(28)
where si = s(Ti) for brevity.
2) Curiosity. Another alternative is to connect to the USP
out of ”human curiosity”, which is here independent
of either social opinion or own quality observation, but
dictated by human nature to explore new opportunities.
We note that our earlier assumption on rationality of the
customers still holds here, since curiosity aims solely at
improving the utility. For the ”curiosity” factor α, the
corresponding probability is given by:
ξ(1− γ)αc. (29)
3) Dissatisfaction. The last considered type of user reac-
tions is when the customer is highly dissatisfied with the
current service – which e.g., happened to be far worse
than what was expected – and decides to connect to
the USP with the probability comprising the ”dissatis-
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faction” factor δ that corresponds to the actual level of
disappointment, which leads us to:
ξ(1−γ)(1−αc)δpu(U(θ; s(Tmi ), pi)−U(θ; si, pi)).
(30)
We note that the probability ξ to consider changing the
current service provider is but a technical parameter here,
which regulates the rate of the process in question as well
as determines how frequently the USP price is reconsidered.
The parameters α, γ, and δ are assumed fixed for all of
the customers. Furthermore, for backward transitions from the
USP to the LSP service, the above three options hold as well:
1) Gossiping. For a customer already connected to the USP,
the ”gossiping rate” towards its initial subscription is
estimated as:
ξγ · xipu(U(θ; si, pi)− U(θ; s0, p0)) . (31)
2) Curiosity. The ”curiosity rate” remains the same as in
(29).
3) Dissatisfaction. The corresponding probability based on
the level of dissatisfaction is given by:
ξ(1−γ)(1−αc)δpu(U(θ; s(Tmi ), pi)−U(θ; s0, p0)),
(32)
where Tmi is the announced throughput and s(T
m
i ) is
the solution to the initial-stage game of the LSPs.
We note that previously inactive customers do not have
expectations and thus may select the USP at the moment
t. Hence, they do so if, after they inquire for the relevant
information, the new utility value is above zero, that is,
with the probability ξγpu(U(θ; s0, p0)), or out of curiosity
ξ(1 − γ)α, since they do not expect any QoS guarantees.
Also, these users disconnect from service with the probability
ξpu (−U(θ; s0, p0)), if at a certain time moment their utility
drops below zero.
D. Capturing system dynamics
In order to capture the dynamic evolution of both the
customer and the USP strategies, we further model the
behavior of the customers on the market independently of their
personal preferences θ, by averaging across the corresponding
market shares. Even though within one group the customers
still tend to act non-uniformly, this approximation appears to
be surprisingly accurate (as we confirm with simulations later
on) to model the overall market evolution. First, we derive all
the needed expressions for describing said dynamics and then
separately calculate the corresponding coefficients (i.e., rates
QXi→j , see below).
We continue by constructing a system of differential equa-
tions, according to which our market is evolving with time:
dy1
dt = (D1 − y1)ξγ(y0 + y1 + y2) ·QG1→0 // gossiping
+(D1 − y1)ξαc(1− γ) // curiosity
+(D1 − y1)ξδ(1− γ) ·QD1→0 // dissatisfaction
−y1ξγ(D1 − y1) ·QG0→1 // gossiping
−y1ξαc(1− γ) // curiosity
−y1ξδ(1− γ) ·QD0→1, // dissatisfaction
dy2
dt = (D2 − y2)ξγ(y0 + y1 + y2)QG20 // gossiping
+(D2 − y2)ξαc(1− γ) // curiosity
+(D2 − y2)ξδ(1− γ) ·QD2→0 // dissatisfaction
−y2ξγ(D2 − y2) ·QG02 // gossiping
−y2ξαc(1− γ) // curiosity
−y2ξδ(1− γ) ·QD0→2, // dissatisfaction
dy0
dt = (D0 − y0)ξγ(y0 + y1 + y2) ·Q∅→0 // gossiping
+(D0 − y0)ξαc(1− γ) // curiosity
−y0ξ ·Q0→∅, // low utility
dp0
pdt = cprice
d(y0+y1+y2)
dt ,
(33)
where the price update coefficient cprice of the USP corresponds
to a unit of time, QGi→0 (or Q
G
0→i) are the coefficients re-
flecting the group-average ”willingness” to change the service
provider from the LSP i to the USP (or backwards) after
inquiring proximate users, while QDi→0 (Q
D
0→i) is the average
”dissatisfaction” rate due to a difference between the quality
announced by the LSP and the actual experienced quality. Fur-
ther, Q∅→0 (Q0→∅) corresponds to a decision on connecting
(disconnecting) for the customers without the SIM-cards. Also
here, 0 ≤ y1 ≤ D1, 0 ≤ y2 ≤ D2, 0 ≤ y0 ≤ D0, and Di are
the initial shares for the LSPs obtained with either Bertrand or
Cournot solutions, while D0 = 1−D1 −D2 are the initially
inactive customers.
1) Changing service provider after proximate interaction:
The current throughput of the customer from the group i is
based on equal sharing of bandwidth, that is, Ti =
Biηi
Nxi
, i =
1, 2 or T0 =
B0η0
N(y0+y1+y2)
, where ηi, i = 0, 1, 2 is the average
spectral efficiency over the coverage area of one mmWave
AAP. We may then calculate si(Ti) = 1b
Ti
+1
+ cTi for each
i = 0, 1, 2 and, denoting these functions as si, continue by
deriving the coefficients QGi→0 and Q
G
0→i that capture system
dynamics under user ”gossiping”. We also note that:
U(θ; s0, p0)− U(θ; si, pi)) = θ(s0 − si)− (p0 − pi).
(34)
Hence, denoting p0−pis0−si as θ0,i, which defines the ranges of
θ, we obtain:
U(θ; s0, p0)− U(θ; si, pi)) > 0,
if θ > θ0,i, s0 > si, or θ < θ0,i, s0 < si,
(35)
and a similar expression can be established for U(θ; s0, p0)−
U(θ; si, pi)) < 0. Further, in order to average over the range
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of θ, we integrate pu (∆U(θ)) separately for ∆U(θ) > 0 and
∆U(θ) < 0 as:
∆U(θ)>0 : 1θmax
∫ (
2
1+e−cu(θ(s0−si)−(p0−pi)) − 1
)
dθ=
θ
θmax
+ 1θmax
2
s0−s1 log(e
−c1θ+c2 + 1),
∆U(θ)<0 : 1θmax
∫ (
2
1+e−cu(θ(s0−si)−(p0−pi)) − 1
)
dθ=
θ
θmax
− 1θmax 2s0−s1 log(ec1θ−c2 + 1).
(36)
Based on the above range, we may now average over the
possible values of θ, and write the following:
QGi→0 =
1
θmax
A2∫
A1
(
2
1+e−cu(θ(s0−si)−(p0−pi)) − 1
)
dθ =[
A2−A1
θmax
+ 1θmax
2
s0−s1 log
e−c1A2+c2+1
e−c1A1+c2+1
]
,
(37)
where A1 ≥ A2 constitute the integration range depending on
i as well as on the type of the initial game as per Table III.
If A ≥ A1, we say that QGi→0 = 0.
TABLE III
CONSIDERED SYSTEM EVALUATION PARAMETERS
s0 > si s0 < si
1
Bertrand Cournot Bertrand Cournot
A1, LSP 1 θmax min(θmax, θ0,i)
A2, LSP 1 max(θ1,2, θ0,i) θ1,2
A1, LSP 2 θ1,2 θmax min(θ1,2, θ0,i) min(θmax, θ0,i)
A2, LSP 2 max(θ2,∅, θ0,i) θ2,∅
1 If s0 = si, a difference between the utilities is only defined by p0 − pi.
Similarly, QG0→i may be obtained with the only difference
that the columns s0 > si and s0 < si swap, and the second
line in (36) is utilized for A1 ≥ A2 (otherwise, QG0→i = 0):
QG0→i =
1
θmax
A2∫
A1
(
2
1+e−cu(θ(s0−si)−(p0−pi)) − 1
)
dθ =[
A2−A1
θmax
+ 1θmax
2
s0−s1 log
e−c1A2+c2+1
e−c1A1+c2+1
]
.
(38)
The above expressions cover all four transitions (within
the groups 1, 2) for both considered game types. Finally, an
inactive customer decides to connect if its utility is above zero
(i.e., θ > p0s0 = θ0,∅):
Q∅→0 =
[
θ2,∅−θ0,∅
θmax
+ 1θmax
2
s0−s1 log
e−c1θ2,∅+c2+1
e−c1θ0,∅+c2+1
]
, (39)
if θ0,∅ < θ2,∅ or zero, otherwise. Let us also calculate
Q0→∅, since this variable and the one above are the only
two parameters of interest for the ”inactive” market share:
Q0→∅=
[
θ0,∅
θmax
− 1θmax 2s0−s1 log e
c1θ0,∅−c2+1
e−c2+1
]
. (40)
2) Changing provider due to customer dissatisfaction:
Dissatisfaction of a customer with the initial subscription to
the LSP i depends directly on U(θ; si(Tmi ), pi)−U(θ; sj , pj)),
where j = 0, i is the index of the current service provider:
U(θ; smi , pi)− U(θ; sj , pj)) > 0,
if θ > θi,j , smi > sj , or θ < θi,j , s
m
i < sj , j = 0, i,
(41)
where smi = si(T
m
i ) and θi,j =
pi−pj
smi −sj . Here, one may employ
all the same derivations as above (even a simpler procedure
would suffice due to the fact that θi,i = 0), based on the
coefficients from Table III. The four coefficients in question
may be obtained according to:
QDi→j =
[
A2−A1
θmax
+ 1θmax
2
smi −sj log
e−c1A2+c2+1
e−c1A1+c2+1
]
, (42)
where we do not need to consider the case of negative utility as
well as the integral corresponding to the one in the proximate
interaction part (see above). We note that at this point all ten
coefficients of interest have been obtained. The corresponding
system of differential equations is rather cumbersome to solve
analytically, but a numerical solution suffices for the purposes
of our analysis.
E. Cooperation between the LSPs (”proxy” functionality)
We finalize this section by modeling possible cooperation
between the LSPs. In particular, we assume that based on a
certain long-term agreement, mmWave AAPs (drone cells) of
the LSP 1 may assist those of the LSP 2 and the other way
around, which has been termed previously the ”proxy” AAP
functionality. As a result, the customers of the LSP i may
be served by the closest AAP of either LSP. Since ”proxy”
handover has to be made transparent for the customer device,
we assume the use of the same frequency band for such
operation, but the system airtime is shared as per the actual
total number of served customers (see Fig. 2 for details).
We remind that the shares of the customers are denoted
as xi, yi, as previously. However, these variables correspond
to the numbers of devices that may be served by the AAPs
of their own LSP. The shares of those that are served by
the assisting LSP are denoted as zxi , zi. The average share 
of ”foreign devices” is calculated according to the geometric
probability to place a point into the area when assistance is
required. Furthermore, the two average spectral efficiencies
ηi, i = 1, 2 are recalculated according to the new integrated
AAP deployment. Given these two spectral efficiencies, we
may then calculate the throughput of a customer, if the LSP
i is assisted by the LSP j, which clearly differs from what
we had before. Namely, T zi =
Bjηi
xi
, (i, j) = (1, 2), (2, 1).
The operation of the USP does not change when the LSPs
cooperate.
Based on the methods similar to those utilized previously,
we rewrite the system (33) by adding two more equations that
reflect the evolution of zi:
dz1
dt = (D1 − y1 − z1)ξγ(y0 + y1 + y2) · Q˜G1→0
+(D1 − y1 − z1)ξαc(1− γ)
+(D1 − y1 − z1)ξδ(1− γ) · Q˜D1→0
−z1ξγ(D1 − y1 − z1) · Q˜G0→1
−z1ξαc(1− γ)
−z1ξδ(1− γ) · Q˜D0→1,
dz2
dt = (D2 − y2 − z2)ξγ(y0 + y1 + y2)Q˜G2→0
+(D2 − y2 − z2)ξαc(1− γ)
+(D2 − y2 − z2)ξδ(1− γ) · Q˜D2→0
−z2ξγ(D2 − y2 − z2) · Q˜G0→2
−z2ξαc(1− γ)
−z2ξδ(1− γ) · Q˜D0→2,
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
dy1
dt = (D1 − y1 − z1)(1− )ξγ(y0 + y1 + y2) ·QG1→0
+(D1 − y1 − z1)(1− )ξαc(1− γ)
+(D1 − y1 − z1)(1− )ξδ(1− γ) ·QD1→0
−y1ξγ(D1 − y1 − z1) ·QG0→1
−y1ξαc(1− γ)
−y1ξδ(1− γ) ·QD0→1,
dz1
dt = (D1 − y1 − z1)ξγ(y0 + y1 + y2) · Q˜G1→0
+(D1 − y1 − z1)ξαc(1− γ)
+(D1 − y1 − z1)ξδ(1− γ) · Q˜D1→0
−z1ξγ(D1 − y1 − z1) · Q˜G0→1
−z1ξαc(1− γ)
−z1ξδ(1− γ) · Q˜D0→1,
dy2
dt = (D2 − y2 − z2)(1− )ξγ(y0 + y1 + y2)QG2→0
+(D2 − y2 − z2)(1− )ξαc(1− γ)
+(D2 − y2 − z2)(1− )ξδ(1− γ) ·QD2→0
−y2ξγ(D2 − y2 − z2) ·QG0→2
−y2ξαc(1− γ)
−y2ξδ(1− γ) ·QD0→2,
dz2
dt = (D2 − y2 − z2)ξγ(y0 + y1 + y2)Q˜G2→0
+(D2 − y2 − z2)ξαc(1− γ)
+(D2 − y2 − z2)ξδ(1− γ) · Q˜D2→0
−z2ξγ(D2 − y2 − z2) · Q˜G0→2
−z2ξαc(1− γ)
−z2ξδ(1− γ) · Q˜D0→2,
dy0
dt = (D0 − y0)ξγ(y0 + y1 + y2 + z1 + z2) ·Q∅→0
+(D0 − y0)ξαc(1− γ)
−y0ξ ·Q0→∅,
dp0
dt = cprice
d(y0+y1+y2)
dt p.
(43)
We note that all of the coefficients without tilde alter according
to the updated spectral efficiencies, while those with tilde
are calculated by the analogy with the above, but based on
different throughputs.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF OUR SYSTEM
A. Implemented modeling environment
In order to carefully model the dynamic evolution of the
system in question, we are not only relying on the above game
theoretic tools, but also conduct a comprehensive system-level
simulation assessment by building our own evaluation platform
with suitable scaling performance to address our large-scale
scenario. The developed simulation platform is based on
our recent rigorous mmWave study in [8] and additionally
implements several unique features that allow it to capture the
intricate interactions between our studied entities:
• The simulator utilizes a rescaled framing for medium
access control, which enables operation across larger time
intervals without affecting the system efficiency.
• The antenna beamforming and body reflection effects
are modeled explicitly by applying a mmWave-specific
TABLE IV
SYSTEM EVALUATION PARAMETERS
Name Description/definition Value
R Area of interest 200m
µ0 Density of devices 0.2 per m2
µ Density of users 2 per m2
hb Average body height 1.7m
rb Average body radius 0.2m
hd Average device elevation 1.2m
φ Half of aperture 10o
βmax Maximum beam inclination 60o
α Antenna ”viewing angle” 270o
hi AAP altitude 15m 15m 30m
Bi Bandwidth1 2GHz 2GHz 6GHz
ptx Transmit power 200 mW
fi Frequency 28GHz 28GHz 60GHz
N0 Noise plus interference -80dBm
GNLOS Reflected beam path decrease -30dB
SNRmax Maximum SNR 20dB
θmax Maximum ”taste”2 234.03
Tm Maximum throughput 100
a, b, c Quality function parameters (12.3600, 0.5619, 0.0098)
ν Costs per unit of demand 3 0.0647
γ ”Gossiping” factor 0.05
αc ”Curiosity” factor 0.05
δ ”Dissatisfaction” factor 0.1
cprice USP price update 0.1
cu Utility ”impact” coefficient 0.1
1 Maximum bandwidth purchased by the LSP may be decreased according
to the difference in the optimal costs at the initial-stage game. For the final
throughput, the value in Hz is multiplied by 0.5 to obtain the ”effective
bandwidth”.
2 Derived under the assumption that the ”richest” customer is ready to pay
not more than 200$ per month (i.e., 0.46 cents per minute).
3 Derived assuming that the annual license costs 50 million dollars per 2
GHz.
channel model based on the ray-tracing results and real
measurements.
The investigated short-term dynamics of the aerial mmWave
access market is assessed for a characteristic scenario with two
LSPs and one USP collocated in a square area of interest with
the side length R = 200m. Each of these market players has a
fleet of mmWave AAPs (drone cells) uniformly deployed over
the area, thus forming a regular hexagonal grid. All AAPs of
the LSPs are placed at the same altitude hi = 15 m, while
the AAPs of the USP occupy h0 = 30 m, which results
in expected numbers of 18 and 5 AAPs, respectively. The
number of (potentially) active customers is N = 8, 000 (the
total number of participants is 80, 000), who are distributed
uniformly across this square area. At every instant of time,
each active customer is served by its closest AAP of the service
provider it is subscribed to. One unit of time corresponds to
one minute. For the complete list of the system settings, we
refer to Table IV.
B. Quantifying market dynamics
We begin with investigating the overall dynamics of our
subject market, where the initial market shares of the LSPs are
determined according to the Bertrand (BM) and the Cournot
models (CM) above. These alternatives represent two extreme
cases of possible market alignment corresponding to the differ-
entiated vs. identical product offers, respectively, and lead to
dissimilar conclusions on system performance. Our first result
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Fig. 6. Shares of our market in dynamics: the Bertrand (top) and Cournot (bottom) games; analysis (left) and simulation (right).
addresses the case when two independent LSPs observe the
consequences of the USP intrusion into ”their” equilibrium
market and capture the temporal evolution of the market shares
illustrated here for the scenario with αc = 0.0083 (equivalent
to a period of 2 hours), γ = 0.05, δ = 0.1, and the initial
price p0 = p2/2. To this end, Fig. 6 indicates time (in
minutes) along the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis
reports the distribution of the shares of the customers for the
market players. On the right side of this plot, we append our
simulation results to validate the analysis on the left side.
The key difference that is revealed when comparing the
BM and the CM cases of the initial-stage modeling is in their
respective market shares (that is, at time t = 0). For the CM,
the LSP 1 and the LSP 2 have equal shares of subscribers
(i.e., 0.33), while the remaining market share comprises the
customers with no SIM-cards (not connected to either LSP). In
contrast, for the BM, the LSP 1 has a larger initial market share
(i.e., 0.58) and the LSP 2 has a smaller one (i.e., 0.29). Further,
we observe that the evolution of these shares has similar trends
for both cases: the USP is able to acquire significant shares
of the market not only by activating the customers with no
SIM-card, but also winning the customers of the LSPs. The
dynamics of this process changes over time by converging
to a stable balance for the LSPs in about 1 hour. Given the
excellent match between our analytical and simulation results,
we focus in the remainder of this section only on the findings
of our mathematical analysis.
We continue by investigating the profit evolution (including
spectrum costs and fees paid by the customers). To this
end, Fig. 7 studies the impact of such factors as consumer
”gossiping”, ”curiosity”, and ”dissatisfaction” over a realis-
tic range of values (lighter curves). We also report more
”extreme” results (darker curves) to highlight the potential
amplitude of the profit. Our first observation is that only user
”curiosity” has a significant effect on the lowest-profitable
USP and the second-profitable LSP 2 (in the BM). Specifically,
it increases the profit of an LSP with the growing αc as well
as alters the convergence time. The latter trend holds for the
”dissatisfaction” factor as well, but an increase in δ for the BM
(but not the CM) results in a lower profit of the highest-price
LSP 1 (since both the announced quality level and the price
are higher). This reveals an important difference between the
BM and the CM in terms of the USP ”intrusion”. The last
remaining ”gossiping” factor γ may significantly lower the
profit of both LSPs (as shown by the ”extreme” line), which
implies that the more the customers interact, the higher utility
they can achieve. This feature – in a way similar to implicit
customer cooperation – is clearly beneficial for them, and
hence suggests a hypothesis on that some level of cooperation
between the LSPs may also bring value. Therefore, we shift
our focus to the cooperation of the LSPs in what follows.
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Fig. 7. Profit of our main market players in dynamics: the Cournot (top) and Bertrand (bottom) games; with ”dissatisfaction” (left), ”gossiping” (middle),
and ”curiosity” (right) factors.
Fig. 8. Consequences of the LSP cooperation in dynamics: the Bertrand (left) and Cournot (right) games; arrows follow changes in profit due to cooperation.
C. Effects of the LSP cooperation
In this subsection, we characterize the market impact of
cooperation between the LSPs, which aims to help serving
their customers more efficiently. Accordingly, Fig. 8 illustrates
the temporal evolution of the LSP profits for the two extreme
values (0.001 and 0.5) of the ”gossiping” factor γ with and
without cooperation. In the plot, an increase in the profit
due to the LSP cooperation is highlighted by the filled areas.
Interestingly, we observe differences between the short- and
the long-term dynamics for both the BM and the CM cases (see
e.g, t < 8 and t > 8). It becomes apparent that cooperation
always benefits the LSP 1, while the LSP 2 wins only for
the CM. On the contrary, for the BM, cooperation may result
in a lower LSP 2 profit, which suggests the importance of
financial compensation from the winning LSP 1. From the
theoretical viewpoint, it translates into the need for a fair utility
sharing. Hence, the aggregate profit could be split between the
LSPs according to e.g., the Shapley value to enforce fairness
of cooperation as it is shown by the bar graphs in Fig. 8.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The unique modeling framework proposed in this paper
makes a decisive step towards understanding the novel market
around the mmWave access systems as part of 5G landscape.
The unexpected and temporary events featuring masses of
people constitute particularly challenging study cases in this
area due to unprecedented bandwidth requirements that can
only be satisfied with emerging radio technologies, such as
aerial mmWave access points. In our systematic performance
characterization, a vertically differentiated market proved to be
particularly suitable to address this novel setting, by modeling
customers that have different preferences with respect to the
access service quality.
To comprehensively model the competition among dissim-
ilar players in the subject market, we utilized the Bertrand
and Cournot games, which lead to drastically different per-
formance results. More specifically, in the Cournot model we
observe that the market is equally shared between the two
LSPs (licensed-band service providers), with subsequent equal
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profit sharing. Here, the total market profit turns out to be
higher than that in the Bertrand model, where instead a clear
differentiation between the two LSPs occurs in terms of profits.
The other side of the coin is that the Cournot model leads
to a lower surplus as well as to a smaller number of served
customers, which may become negative factors with respect
to the long-term customer loyalty.
Another lesson learned as a result of our analysis is in
that the factors of the customer behavior, such as ”gossiping”,
”curiosity”, and ”dissatisfaction”, yield various consequences
for the access market dynamics and the resulting profits, as
well as depend on whether the Bertrand or Cournot game is
played initially. Whenever the customers enjoy high levels of
interaction with each other, they can collectively improve their
utility by dynamically adapting their service provider choices.
At that time, we study the presence of the USP (unlicensed-
band service provider) on the market in question, mindful of
customer adaptation dynamics. Competing against the USP,
the LSPs may also engage into mutual cooperation to better
satisfy the customer demands and thus increase their profits.
Here, the need for a fair sharing of the resulting profit is
essential to guarantee benefits for both cooperating LSPs, and
we adopt the Shapley value for that purpose.
Concluding this work, we are convinced that our first-
hand game theoretic modeling conducted in this paper should
become a useful reference point for future discussions on
the dynamic 5G market environments. Multiple new research
directions may stem from our present contribution along the
lines of dynamic deployment and operation optimization of
the AAPs (aerial access points), profit maximization studies
across a range of service and business models that enable
customer-driven decision making, as well as further game
theoretic analysis of alternative taste parameter distributions
and market player strategies.
APPENDIX
A. Blocking probability illustration
Device
d
S
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Fig. 9. Illustration of mmWave blockage probability.
Let us establish here the probability of blockage by a
cylindric object, if the device is located at the distance d from
the AAP. We assume that the mmWave radio ”shadow” is
equivalent in its shape and size to the one that visible light
creates, and that the LOS is blocked iff the axis of symmetry
of the radio beam is blocked (see SC in Fig. 9.b). Then, the
closest blocking body may be located at the point A, while
the device is placed at the point B, and the locus of centers
of all the possible blockers is indicated by a hatched region in
Fig. 9.c of area Sb ≈ 2rb ·AB (we assume that no center can
be placed closer than rb). Here, 2rb is the width of the cylinder
representing the human body, rmax = d tanφ, φ is a half of
the beam angle, and AB is the longest distance between the
device and its blocker. The latter may be calculated based on
the properties of similar triangles:
h−hd
d =
hb−hd
AB−rb ,
where h, hb, and hd are the altitude of AAP, the blocker height,
and the device elevation, respectively. Given the above, we
obtain:
AB = dhb−hdh−hd + rb ⇒ Sb = 2rb · d
(
hb−hd
h−hd
)
.
We note that the latter expression is valid if the center of the
blocker is located between the projection O and the blocked
device, and we disregard the cases when the shadow is ”egg-
shaped”. Due to our assumption on the PPP of the blockers, the
probability of not being blocked may be produced as follows:
Pr{no blockers in the area} ≈ e−µ·2rb
(
d
hb−hd
h−hd
)
,
where µ is the density of all the participants on the ground of
the large-scale event in question.
B. Area of beam on the ground
Theorem 1. Consider an AAP at the altitude h, its closest
device, and a device located at the distance d. Then, for the
beam aperture 2φ, the area covered by the beam under the
AAP equals S0 = pi (h tan (φ))
2. Further, the ratio between
the areas S0 and S(d), produced by the device located at the
distance d, equals:
S(d)
S0
= cos(φ)√
cos2(φ)− d2
d2+h2
. (44)
Proof. Assuming that the area directly under the AAP is a
circle or radius a, so that S0 = pia2, the area S may be
established as pia·b = pia2/√1− e2, where a = h tan (φ) and
b are the minor and the major radius of the ellipse, respectively,
e is its eccentricity, and φ is a half of the beam aperture. We
note that the eccentricity of the ellipse representing the result
of conic section by a plane e = cosψ/ cosφ, where ψ is the
angle between the plane (in our case, the ground) and the cone
symmetry axis, that is:
tan (ψ) = hd ⇒ cos2 (ψ) = 11+h2
d2
. (45)
Therefore, we may obtain the following ratio:
S
S0
= 1√√√√
1−
1
1+h
2
d2
cos2 (φ)
= cos(φ)√
cos2(φ)− d2
d2+h2
.
(46)
17
C. Probability of the reflected path
We assume that in case the LOS link does not exist, the
mmWave connection between the AAP and its associated
device may be supported via a signal reflected from e.g.,
another human body. Excluding the blocked device and its
possible blocker, we need to estimate whether any other human
body is present within the area covered by the directed beam.
Utilizing our assumption on the PPP for the devices, we may
establish the probability of NLOS path as follows:
qNLOS(d)=Pr{NLOS at d}=1−exp
(
−µpi(h tan (φ))2·cos(φ)√
cos2(φ)− d2
d2+h2
)
.
(47)
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